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The Making of a Terrorist: A Need for Understanding from the Field 
Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
Washington, DC, March 12, 2008 
 
Chairman Price, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify.  
I am an anthropologist who has done fieldwork for the last 35 years in many cultures around the world 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Atran). I have experimented extensively on the ways scientists and 
ordinary people categorize and reason about nature, on the cognitive and social psychology of religion, 
and on the limits of rational choice in political and cultural conflict (http://www.scottatran.com). Ever 
since 9/11 I have interviewed and studied terrorists and wannabes, as well as their families and supporters, 
in communities from remote Indonesian Islands to North Africa, and in places scattered through Pakistan, 
Palestine, and the suburbs of European cities. My colleagues and I have discussed this research (funded 
by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research in conjunction with John Jay College, and the National 
Science Foundation in conjunction with the University of Michigan) in numerous briefings to NSC and 
HSC staff at the White House, and to counter-terrorism officials in various branches of our government 
and other governments around the world. I have come to the conclusion that the only way to effectively 
intervene in the radicalization process to violence and terrorism in a way that is sustainable in the long 
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term is through field-based scientific research. Approaches based on “gut feelings,” or on theories that are 
not systematically built or tested on data from the field, will not prevent the next and future generations of 
youth from taking a path to political violence, no matter how effective may be law-enforcement and 
military measures in the short term. 
 
Soccer, paintball, camping, hiking, rafting, body building, martial arts training and other forms of 
physically stimulating and intimate group action create a bunch of buddies, which becomes a “band of 
brothers” in a simple heroic cause. It’s usually enough that a few of these action buddies identify with a 
cause, and its heroic path to glory and esteem in the eyes of peers, for the rest to follow even unto death. 
Humans need to socially organize, to lead and be led; however, notions of “charismatic leaders” and 
Svengali-like “recruiters” that “brainwash” unwitting minds into joining well-structured organizations 
with command and control is exaggerated. Viewed from the field, notions of “cells” and “recruitment” - 
and to a degree even “leadership” – may reflect more the psychology and organization of those analyzing 
terrorist groups than terrorist groups themselves (see Marc Sageman’s Leaderless Jihad, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
 
Takfiris (from takfir, “excommunication”) are rejectionists who disdain other forms of Islam, including 
wahabism (an evangelical creed preaching Calvinist-like obedience to the state) and most fundamentalist, 
or salafi, creeds (which oppose fighting between co-religionists as sowing discord, or fitna, in the Muslim 
community). They tend to go to violence in small groups consisting mostly of friends, and some kin 
(although friends tend to become kin as they marry one another's sisters and cousins - there are dozens of 
such marriages among militant members of Southeast Asia's Jemaah Islamiyah). These groups arise 
within specific "scenes": neighborhoods, schools (classes, dorms), workplaces and common leisure.  
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Consider 4 examples: 
1. In Al Qaeda, about 70 percent join with friends, 20 percent with kin. At a meeting organized last month 
by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of the Interior, counter-terrorism officials in Riyadh showed us recent data on 
captured terrorists that replicated these numbers. Interviews with friends of the 9/11 suicide pilots reveal 
they weren't "recruited" into Qaeda. They were Middle Eastern Arabs isolated even among the Moroccan 
and Turkish Muslims who predominate in Germany. Seeking friendship, they began hanging out after 
services at the Masjad al-Quds and other nearby mosques in Hamburg, in local restaurants and in the 
dormitory of the Technical University in the suburb of Harburg. Three wound up living together as they 
self-radicalized (Mohammed Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al-Shehhi). Their friends told us they 
wanted to go to Chechnya, then Kosovo, only landing in a Qaeda camp in Afghanistan as a third choice. 
2. Five of the seven plotters in the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings who blew themselves up when 
cornered by police grew up in the tumble-down neighborhood of Jemaa Mezuak in Tetuan, Morocco. In 
2006, at least five more young Mezuaq men went to Iraq on "martyrdom missions.” All 5 attended a local 
elementary school, the same one that Madrid’s Moroccan bombers attended. And 4 of the 5 were in the 
same high school class. They played soccer as friends, went to the same mosque (Masjad al-Rohban of 
the Dawa Tabligh), mingled in the same restaurants, barbershops and cafes. “They gave one another 
courage to go to Iraq,” said another friend who dropped out, not because he thought their cause wrong but 
because he found a different way through community work “to help Muslims.” 
3. Hamas's most sustained suicide bombing campaign in 2003-4 involved several buddies from Hebron's 
Masjad (mosque) al-Jihad soccer team. Most lived in the Wad Abu Katila neighborhood and belonged to 
the al-Qawasmeh hamula (clan); several were classmates in the neighborhood's local branch of the 
Palestinian Polytechnic College. Their ages ranged from 18 to 22. At least 8 team members were 
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dispatched to suicide shooting and bombing operations by the Hamas military leader in Hebron, Abdullah 
al-Qawasmeh. On February 4, 2008, two friends who were members of the Masjad al-Jihad soccer team, 
staged a suicide bombing at a commercial center in Dimona, Israel. The mother of one of these young 
men told us that her son “loved soccer and those boys [who had died in 2003].” Although Hamas claimed 
responsibility for the Dimona attack, politburo leadership in Damascus and Beirut was not aware at first 
of who initiated and carried out the attack .At the Knesset last month, Israeli officials told us that 
Mahmoud Zahar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, and Ahmed Al Ja’abri, the military commander of the Izz ad-
Din al-Qassam Brigades, probably wanted to launch an operation after Zahar’s son was killed in an Israeli 
raid and Hamas breached the border wall between Gaza and Egypt. Al-Ja’abri, who is originally from 
Hebron, called upon his clan ally, Ayoub Qawasmeh, to do an operation. Ayoub Qawasmeh then tapped 
into the young men on the soccer team who had been earnestly waiting to do something for their 
comrades and their cause. 
4. The “Virginia Jihad” Network involved a diverse group of 12, mostly middle-class, young men based 
in Washington, DC suburbs, affiliated with an Islamic educational center in Falls Church, Virginia. 
Several formed a band of paintball buddies that eventually focused on waging violent jihad in 
Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Chechnya. Seven members of the network traveled to Pakistan in 2000 and 
2001 and obtained military training from a Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Al-Qaeda ally that was then waging jihad 
against Indian forces in Kashmir. Three members subsequently assisted LET in procuring advanced 
electronic technology for use against India. Federal prosecution resulted in the most convictions by the 
United States Department of Justice in any single terrorism case to date. Nevertheless, after discussing 
details with a former federal prosecutor in the case, it was evident that there was little investigation into 
sociological factors and little, if any, institutional precedent for acquiring information into the social 
background and personal history of how and why these people go to violence. 
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The ultimate mission of a robust national program of field-based research is more effective intervention 
strategies based on sound science. The aim is to refine the way the U.S. intervenes around the world so 
that the “rare events” (individuals who become motivated into actually committing an act of political 
violence) become even rarer. Such research should enable interventions that increase the range and 
exposure of options to individuals who are showing up in these rare events. The goal of modeling and 
predicting which ones of the tens of thousands of youth that “seem alike” will commit acts of political 
violence is not promising. But the goal of designing and assessing political, economic and social 
developments that enable young people to dream other dreams that give meaning to their lives and those 
of their friends and community is attainable. As our recent discussions with leaders of the FBI’s 
community outreach suggests, in order to imagine a different future as affirmative actors in a more 
enlightened world requires sensitivity to details of local contexts and input from local communities 
(including those created in chat rooms): in short, detailed and context-sensitive field-based research. 
 
Apart from a very, very few specific projects, current terrorism-related programs and centers have no 
field-based research focus, training, skill set (practical or theoretical) or capacity commensurate with the 
task at hand. Rather than simply try to add on field-based research initiatives to current programs and 
centers that have no actual experience in the field, efforts should concentrate on expanding research 
capacity and training based on the few successful field-based projects that currently exist. This holds 
promise for saving national treasure and lives. 
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 The Madrid Train Bombings, March 11, 2004 
Through a series of unplanned events, two young North African immigrants bonded to plot an attack in 
Spain. One, a Tunisian (Serhane Fakhet) would-be intellectual who spun into increasingly extremist circles, 
the other (Jamal Ahmidan), an extremely violent Moroccan drug dealer: they lived in separate worlds - the 
criminal underworld and religious extremism - until their paths crossed six months before the bombing. A 
detailed attack plan only began to coalesce in late December 2003, shortly after the internet tract "Iraqi Jihad, 
Hopes and Risks” circulated on the Zarqawi-affiliated website, Global Islamic Media Front. The tract called 
for “two or three attacks… to exploit the coming general elections in Spain in March 2004.”  
Tetuan (Mezuak) Connection:
Madrid 3-11 Bomb Attacks
Ahmidan & 
Serhane Merger
Network Closure
Morata Farmhouse, Site of 
Bomb Preparation
M-11 Bomb
Attacks 2004 
Explosives Group
Allouch’s Apt. in Villavede. 
Site of takfiri Meetings 
Disputes between Serhane
Fakhet & friends and the M-30 
mosque imam over the 9/11 
attacks made attending taboo
Plaza Cabasteros,
Lavapies neighborhood, 
Madrid, where J. Ahmidan
& Friends dealt drugs
Before meeting up with the hands-on
Ahmidan group, Serhane planned
and  played jihad at picnics
7 members of the merged group 
holed up in a flat in Leganes since
the attack blew themselves up when
cornered by authorities; 5 were from
the Mezuak barrio in Tetuan,Morocco
In late 2001, Serhane & friends
began having informal
« takfiri» meetings with a police 
informant, CARTAGENA, in 
attendance
Student Firebrand 
Serhane & Friends
Business connections and past
incarceration helped the Ahmidan
group to add force to Serhane’s 
rhetoric, which soon led to the 
exchange of drugs and money for the 
explosives necessary to finally attack
Between 2000 and 2003, 
Moroccan drug dealer 
Jamal Ahmidan, admired
and feared, is in an out of 
Spanish and Moroccan
prisons
Ahmidan Drug 
Gang
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The Jamaa Mezuak Connection: 
After the Madrid plotters from Mezuak blew themselves up (April 3, 
2004), friends in the neighborhood began contemplating their own
“matyrdom actions” in Iraq (beginning in summer 2006)
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Jamaa Mezuak Connection
Tetuan (Jamaa Mezuak
neighborhood) Connection: 
Madrid 2004 to Iraq 2006
Confused by the deaths of the Madrid plotters that they
had known since childhood, a group of friends self-
radicalize and begin to leave for " martyrdom
missions" in Iraq in the summer of 2006
Al-Rohban, the Dawa Tabligh, mosque in Mezuak
where Kounjaa first preached takfiri ideology and 
where the other young men came to pray. The 
Imam collected zaqat charity to send them to Iraq.
Down a littered hill from al-Rohban mosque, kids play the favorite 
neighborhood sport,  soccer.  All of Mezuak’s Madrid plotters and 
wannabe martyrs for Iraq were avid players
Students leaving for home from the Abdelkrim Khattabi
Primary School, which all of Mezuak’s Madrid plotters and 
wannabe martyrs for Iraq attended.
Jihadi Nest or Just a 
Normal Community:
A Surveying of the 
Mezuak Neighborhood
in Morocco
Cafe Chicago, a once popular 
hangout is located on Mamoun
Stret, Mezuak’s main 
thoroughfare. Like many other 
cafes, it boasts a large television 
that remains tuned to Al Jazeera
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THE Hamas al-Jihad Mosque Soccer Team Attacks 
 
In February 2008, we interviewed members of the families of suicide bombers Mohammed Herbawi and 
Shadi Zghayer, shortly after an attack in Dimona, Israel. This was the first suicide attack claimed by 
Hamas since December 2004, when Hamas declared a unilateral truce on martyrdom actions across the 
Green Line. These two friends were members of the same Hamas neighborhood soccer group as several 
others who died in 2003, the Masjad al-Jihad team. Herbawi's mother, Basma Harmoni (she's divorced), 
said her son loved all those boys.  
 
A
bdullahal-Q
aw
asm
eh
A
hm
edBader
H
am
za al-Q
w
asm
eh
M
ahm
oud al-Q
aw
asm
eh
M
uhsein al-Q
aw
asm
eh
H
azem
 al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Fadi al-Fahudi
Fuad al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Basam
 at-Takruri
M
ujahed al-Ja'abri
SufianH
ariz
H
am
as ‘Soccer Team
’
Suicide A
ttacks, M
arch
5 &
 7, M
ay 17 &
 18
Com
m
unity Icon &
Focal Point for Self-
O
rganization
M
asjad al-Jihad 
M
osque in 
H
ebron boasts a 
popular soccer 
team
 and a long 
list of m
artyrs 
Soccer field at Ibrahim
 al-D
abat School
Playing pick-
up soccer in 
the streets of 
H
ebron, these
boys illustrate
the principle 
of self-
organization
around a
com
m
on 
interest
In N
eed of D
evelopm
ent
In the W
ad A
bu Katila neighborhood, 
w
here a num
ber of the al-Jihad 
players turned suicide attackers 
lived, trash and decrepit 
infrastructure m
ar the landscape
Still Rebuilding...
Partially rebuilt hom
es 
are the norm
 in the 
H
arat e-Sheikh 
neighborhood after 
Israeli forces leveled it in
reponse to terror attacks
M
em
bers of the
al-Jihad M
osque
soccer team
H
am
za al-Q
w
asm
eh
M
ahm
oud al-Q
aw
asm
eh
M
uhsein al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Fadi al-Fahudi
Fuad al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Basam
 at-Takruri
M
ujahed al-Ja'abri
1
al-Jihad
players
that lived
in W
ad A
bu
Katila neighborhood
H
am
za al-Q
w
asm
eh
M
uhsein al-Q
aw
asm
eh
H
azem
 al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Fadi al-Fahudi
Fuad al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Basam
 at-Takruri
2
Tw
o al-Jihad team
-
m
ates that lived in 
H
arat e-Sheikh
M
ahm
oud al-Q
aw
asm
eh
M
ujahed al-Ja'abri
3
Fo
llo
w
in
g
 th
e lead
 o
f M
u
h
sein
an
d
 th
eir o
th
er team
m
ates, tw
o
 
m
o
re al-Jih
ad
 p
layers fro
m
 W
ad
A
b
u
 K
atila an
d
 o
n
e fro
m
 H
arat
e-Sh
eikh
 co
o
rid
in
ate effo
rts w
ith
 
th
e lo
cal H
am
as lead
ersh
ip
 to
 d
o
a series o
f su
icid
e b
o
m
b
in
g
s in
 
Jeru
salem
 an
d
 H
eb
ro
n
A
bdullahal-Q
aw
asm
eh
A
hm
edBader
Fuad al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Basam
 at-Takruri
M
ujahed al-Ja'abri
5
A
 b
ystan
d
er
atten
d
s to
 o
n
e
o
f th
e m
an
y 
w
o
u
n
d
ed
Scen
e fro
m
 o
n
e
o
f th
e su
ccessfu
lly
d
eto
n
ated
 b
o
m
b
s
in
 Jeru
salem
D
estru
ctio
n
 in
Jeru
salem
A
 larg
e
fu
n
eral
p
ro
cessio
n
fo
r a Jew
ish
co
u
p
le
A
ssistin
g
 th
e w
o
u
n
d
ed
 in
K
iryat A
rb
a
Trag
ed
y in
 
K
iryat A
rb
a
Culprits in the coordinated
suicide-m
ission gun assaults 
against the inhabitants of 
the Kiryat A
rba and G
evohot
settlem
ents.
A
bdullah al-Q
aw
asm
eh
A
hm
ed Bader
M
uhsein al-Q
aw
asm
eh
H
azem
 al-Q
aw
asm
eh
Fadi al-Fahudi
Sufian H
ariz
4
M
arch
 5
 &
 7
,
2
0
0
3
M
ay 1
7
 &
1
8
, 2
0
0
3
H
am
as ‘So
ccer Team
’ Su
icid
e 
B
o
m
b
in
g
s, Feb
ru
ary 4,  2008
M
oham
m
ed H
erbaw
i
Shadi Zhayer
A
youb Q
aw
asm
eh
A
hm
edal-Ja'abri
M
ahm
oud Zahar
M
ourning loss
Stem
m
ing the tide...
A
 crane and suspended cargo 
container block m
igrant flow
s
at a breach in Rafa along the
G
aza-Egyptian border
Killed in clashes
Funeral for H
am
as m
ili-
tants killed by Egyptian 
forces in Rafa
A
 relative of a m
ilitant to 
the left grieves on a 
side street
2
The attack 
M
oving around the suicide bom
ber,
police sort through the debris and
w
reckage in the afterm
ath of the attack
A
 Zaka param
edic
service volunteer
cleans blood from
the scene of the 
bom
bing
3
A
re you proud?
N
o, I am
 sad
4
H
erb
aw
i’s m
o
th
er cryin
g
 w
ith
 h
is 
p
h
o
to
 in
 h
an
d
.  
Excitem
ent + G
roup G
am
es + Extrem
ism
 =
Sim
ple A
ssociations, Com
plex Social Identities 
and an Increased Likelihood in Violence
A
 Palestin
ian
 yo
u
th
b
ein
g
 d
etain
ed
 b
y 
m
em
b
ers o
f th
e 
Israeli m
ilitary
D
etention in H
ebron
“Cham
pionship of 
the M
artyr Ra’ed M
issak”
G
raffiti at Ib
rah
im
 al-D
ab
at
so
ccer field
 co
m
m
en
m
o
rates
th
e su
icid
e b
o
m
b
er R
a’ed
 M
issak
w
h
o
 d
eto
n
ated
 a b
o
m
b
 o
n
 a Jeru
salem
b
u
s, A
u
g
u
st 19, 2003
D
ead
ly 
Eq
u
atio
n
1
“Peo
p
le d
o
 n
o
t kill an
d
 d
ie ju
st fo
r a cau
se;
th
ey d
o
 it fo
r each
 o
th
er.”
A
ctio
n
 B
u
d
d
ies (so
ccer, p
ain
tb
all, cam
p
in
g
)
+
 A
 Stro
n
g
 b
u
t Sim
p
le, M
o
rally O
u
trag
in
g
C
au
se +
 Reso
n
an
ce w
ith
 Perso
n
al Exp
erien
ce
=
 R
ad
ical So
cial Id
en
tity +
 G
ro
u
p
 V
io
len
ce
     H
. Q
w
asm
eh
 (1/17)
       M
u
h
. al-Q
aw
asm
eh
 (3/5)
    M
. al-Q
aw
asm
eh
 (3/7)         H
. al-Q
aw
asm
eh
 (3/7)
       F. al-Fah
u
d
i (3/7)
         F. al-Q
aw
asm
eh
 (5/17) 
M
. H
erb
aw
i
S. Z
g
h
ayer 
Th
e H
am
as al-Jih
ad
 So
ccer Team
 A
ttacks: O
u
t o
f H
eb
ro
n
, W
est B
an
k
{
Jan
. 17
M
ah
m
o
u
d
 Z
ah
ar
A
h
m
ed
 al-Ja’ab
ri
     B. at-Takru
ri (5/18)
A
h
m
ed
 B
ad
er
A
b
d
u
llah
al-Q
aw
asm
eh
M
ay 17-18 
H
am
as
Lead
ersh
ip
H
am
as
O
p
eratives
LEG
EN
D
M
u
h
.  al-
Q
aw
asm
eh
Fam
ily
H
erb
aw
i
Fam
ily
M
arch
 5
A
yo
u
b
 Q
aw
asm
eh
M
arch
 7, 
M
o
st w
ere n
eig
h
b
o
rs
in
 W
ad
 A
b
u
 K
atila
 11
The Virginia Jihad & Paintball Network 
 
On the night of 9/11, DC native Ali al-Timimi, a doctoral student in cancer research at George Mason 
University in Fairfax, VA, spoke at the Dar al-Arqam, an educational center in Falls Church, VA, saying 
the attacks should not be condemned. Thereafter, al-Timimi was banned from speaking at Dar al-Arqam 
(much as Tunisian Takfiri Serhane Fakhet was expelled from the M-30 mosque in Madrid). But al-Timimi 
was supported by members of a paramilitary group that trained for Jihad by playing paintball (a game 
where one team tries to eliminate players on the opposing team by shooting them with capsules of water-
soluble dye from air-powered guns). Beginning in 2000, several in the group traveled to Pakistan and 
obtained military training from Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Al-Qaeda ally fighting in Kashmir. Seifullah 
Chapman, a Caucasian convert and former U.S. Marine, who returned from Pakistan in August 2001, 
acted as ‘drill sergeant’. After 9/11, the plan was to engage U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  
DC Network t
Hasan Kwon
Chapman      Chandia M.Kahn
Royer      AbdurRaheem
Three 
members 
served in the 
U.S. Military, 
imparting 
military tactics 
to other 
members
Al-Hamdi Benkahla
Surratt       Aatique Al-Timimi
Mostly Middle-class young men, many attended  
the top Universities in the DC area
The Virginia Jihad & 
Paintball Network
Paramilitary games –
Paintball used as 
training for fighting jihad
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Conspiracy to assist Lashkar-e-
Taiba, a Pakistani terrorist group
fighting in Kashmir & allied with 
Al-Qaeda
i  t  i t - -
i ,  i t i t i t 
fi ti  i  i   lli  it  
l-
Virginia Links to 
Lashkar – e – Taiba
(LET) Pakistan
Pakistan POC- Mohammed 
Khan
LET Propoganda
Poster
Procured military equipment for LETr r  ilit r  i t f r 
Several members trained in paid 
their own way to train in Pakistan –
many others donated  money to the  
cause
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The Need for Field-Based Research into Sacred Cultural Values 
 
Most current risk management approaches to countering terrorism often assume that adversaries model 
the world on the basis of rational choices that are commensurable across cultures. From interviews and 
psychological experiments with terrorists and those who inspire and care for them, we have learned that 
individuals who join the jihad, especially would-be martyrs (suicide bombers), often seem motivated by 
non-instrumental values and small-group dynamics that trump rational self-interest. Such “sacred” values 
comprise the core of cultural morality and social identity. They differ from material or instrumental values 
by incorporating moral beliefs that drive action in ways dissociated from prospects for success. 
 
Field studies, including surveys designed as experiments rather than simple probes of attitudes,  indicate 
that such values do not generate standard calculations regarding cost and benefit, sensitivity to quantity, 
tradeoffs across moral categories (e.g., family vs. God), or commensuration between different cultural 
frames. This means that traditional calculations of how to defeat or deter an enemy - for example, by 
providing material incentives to defect or threatening retaliation against supporting populations - may not 
succeed. For negotiators, policy makers and others who must interact with unfamiliar cultures, it is 
important to understand sacred values in order to know which social transgressions and offers for 
tradeoffs are likely to remain morally taboo. Planning and acting in ignorance or disregard of different 
value frameworks may exacerbate conflict, with grievous loss of national treasure and lives. 
 
Our research tells us that when there is a confrontation involving sacred values, then offers to give up or 
exchange sacred values for material incentives is taken as a deep insult, which only increases disgust and 
the moral outrage that inspires violence. According to the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, the chief 
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aim of counterterrorism efforts is to “minimize U.S. costs in lives and treasure, while imposing 
unsustainable costs on the enemy.”  To a significant degree, however, terrorists do not respond to a 
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. The conspirators in the summer 2006 plot to blow up airliners with liquid 
chemicals smuggled aboard knowingly chose the targets most watched; in fall 2007, plotters in Ulm, 
Germany knew they were under surveillance and flaunted this knowledge in a display of costly 
commitment to their cause. Committed terrorists respond to moral values, and are more than willing to die 
for the cause. Rather than “minimizing” the appeal and effect of Jihad by raising their costs in lives, each 
death inspires many more young Muslims to join the cause. Indeed, our utilitarian position actually plays 
into the hands of terrorists who turn it around to show that America and its allies try to reduce people to 
material matter rather than moral beings 
 
Almost no prior research has been conducted investigating value judgment and decision making in the 
domain of political violence and terrorism that is field-based. Most speculations are extrapolated from 
studies of Western college students, business negotiators and politicians. Models of individual and group 
based choices have tended to assume that theories of bounded rationality can explain choices to commit 
oneself or one’s group to acts of political violence and terrorism. However, based on our research among 
Palestinian members of Hamas, members of radical madrassah’s in Indonesia, and radical Israeli settlers, 
we find that decisions to commit oneself or one’s community to political violence are driven by moral 
intuitions rather than cost-benefit calculations of realpolitik, the marketplace or “business-like” 
negotiations. The implication is that in order to understand, model and predict terrorism and political 
violence we need to apply our emerging understanding of moral decision-making to a broader cross-
cultural field investigation of the cognitive and emotional processes involved in decisions to engage in 
acts of political violence and terrorism. 
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